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INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
AFTER ROME: CONCERNS FROM A U.S.
MILITARY PERSPECTIVE
WILLIAM K. LIETZAU*
I
INTRODUCTION
On July 17, 1998, a United Nations Convention room in Rome filled with
cheers as the text for the Statute to Establish an International Criminal Court
(the “ICC”) was adopted by a vote of 120 to seven, with twenty-one absten-
tions.  At times, it appeared that the cheers were as much to celebrate the de-
feat of the United States, which had demanded the vote, as they were to ap-
plaud the adoption of the text.  While many have praised U.S. proposals and
contributions to the ICC treaty, there are also numerous detractors of its refusal
to join.  No one argues that the absence of the United States from the commu-
nity of ICC proponents is ideal, especially since the United States has consis-
tently supported the concept of an ICC for many years,1 but the question re-
mains as to whether this means the United States is wrong not to join the treaty.
Perhaps equally disturbing, the United States has received criticism for the
broader foreign policy pattern that seems to be emerging in which it is increas-
ingly isolated and maligned as a black sheep during multilateral negotiations.
Frequently, this isolation appears to be associated with a conservative attitude
on the part of the U.S. armed forces with respect to recent developments in the
law of war.  Only nine months prior to the vote on the ICC, the U.S. delegation
to an international negotiation in Oslo walked out of the conference hall the
day before voting for a treaty to ban landmines was scheduled, thus precluding
the need to break consensus and demand a vote.  In both instances, the Ottawa
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This article, in significant part, was previously published in the United States Air Force Academy’s
Journal of Legal Studies as One Road Away from Rome: Concerns Regarding the International Criminal
Court, 9 U.S.A.F.  ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD. 33 (1999).  Special recognition should be given to Rear Ad-
miral Michael F. Lohr, JAGC, USN, who, as Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, contributed so much wisdom and leadership to the legal and policy debate discussed herein.
1. President Clinton, for example, gave public support for a permanent international criminal
court on six occasions prior to the diplomatic conference in Rome.  See David J. Scheffer, The United
States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 12, 13 (1999)(providing citation for
each).
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Convention2 and the Rome Treaty,3 the United States was largely isolated in-
ternationally—opposed not only by historic “adversaries,” but also by many of
its closest traditional allies.4  Again, few would argue that these are happy cir-
cumstances, but does that mean the remedy is to capitulate and more readily
join the majority in negotiations that produce results contrary to the interests of
the United States?
The answer to both questions is no.  The specific decision to remain outside
the Rome Treaty as currently formulated is the right one, and so is the more
general willingness of the United States to stand firm in the minority.  The
emerging multi-polar, post-Cold War negotiating dynamic may call for some
policy adjustments, but capitulation is not the answer—neither in the decision
regarding whether to sign the ICC Statute, nor as a broader negotiating posture
in future fora.5
The United States has stated that it has no present or future intention to
sign the current formulation of the Rome Treaty.6  This is consistent with its
posture throughout the ICC negotiation process.  At the Rome Conference, the
U.S. delegation clearly stated that it would be forced to oppose any treaty that
2. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 8, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 [hereinafter Ottawa Conven-
tion].  The United States was unsuccessful in its attempt to convince negotiating delegations to build
provisions into the treaty that would allow for self-destructing/self-deactivating submunitions as part of
a mixed anti-tank/anti-personnel mine package or to accommodate the situation requiring landmine
use along the northern border of the Republic of Korea.  See generally Andrew C.S. Efaw, The United
States’ Refusal to Ban Landmines: The Intersection Between Tactics, Strategy, Policy, and International
Law, 159 MIL. L. REV. 87 (1999).
3. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9,
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998)(as reissued by the U.N. Secretariat Legal Counsel after making tech-
nical modifications to the text adopted by the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court in Rome, Italy, June 15-July 17, 1998) [hereinafter
“ICC Statute” or “Rome Treaty”].
4. The Ottawa Convention has been signed by all NATO allies except Turkey and the United
States.  Only China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar, and Yemen joined the United States in voting against
the Rome Treaty.  See Mark Fritz,  Pentagon seeks funds for new type of land mine, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
20, 1999, at A1; Marilyn Henry, Treaty to create Permanent International War Crimes Tribunal,
JERUSALEM POST, July 19, 1998, at A1.
5. Recent developments in multilateral negotiations evince a possible shift from this unfortunate
trend.  For example, the United States was able to join a consensus regarding the text that emerged
from the Diplomatic Conference on the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.  See generally Jan Hladik, Documents: Diplomatic
Conference on the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, Netherlands (Mar. 15-26, 1999), 8 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP.
526 (1999).  Similarly, a compromise was reached in the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, recently approved by the General
Assembly at U.N. Doc. A/54/L.84 (2000).  Article 1 represents a compromise between those who
wanted to proscribe all military activities, including recruitment, involving persons under eighteen, and
those who recruit younger persons, with the following language: “State Parties shall take all feasible
measures to ensure that members of their armed forces who have not attained the age of eighteen years
do not take a direct part in hostilities.”
6. See David J. Scheffer, Statement on the International Criminal Court, Remarks Before the 53rd
Session of the U.N. General Assembly, in the Sixth Committee, USUN Press Release No. 179 (Oct. 21,
1998) [hereinafter Sixth Committee Statement] (available at http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/
1998/981021_scheffer_icc.html; Statement of the United States before the U.N. General Assembly (Dec. 8,
1998)(on file with the State Department)).
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claimed jurisdiction over non-party nationals.  The ICC contemplated by a plain
reading of the Rome Treaty is unacceptably flawed in this respect.  So, too, is
the “fast-track” treaty-making process that created it.  As currently postured,
neither text nor process deserve U.S. support.
II
U.S. CONCERNS LEADING UP TO ROME
Prior to the Rome negotiations, the U.S. military identified a number of
substantive concerns with the draft treaty text.  Foremost among these were the
following: jurisdiction or the “trigger mechanism,” definitions and elements of
crimes, state cooperation obligations in light of national security requirements,
and rules of evidence and procedure.  These concerns stemmed from a belief
that an ICC lacking appropriate checks and balances would be vulnerable to
political manipulation and, in turn, would detract from the rule of law.  Well-
intentioned calls for more ready and unimpaired enforcement of the laws of war
must be tempered and balanced by the human rights of an accused, a commit-
ment to fairness, acknowledgment of legitimate national security interests, and
respect for the rule of law itself.  This sense of balance inspired U.S. positions in
Rome and continues to be the centerpiece of current concerns.
With reference to jurisdiction, it was always envisaged that the ICC would
complement national justice systems, not replace them.  There are both practi-
cal reasons and profound concerns of principle that militate against an ICC role
independent of the states that imbue it with authority.  From a utilitarian per-
spective, there is a legitimate concern that an unconstrained jurisdiction would
simply overwhelm the court.  Also, the clearest current deterrent to widespread
violation of the law is found in state domestic law and the disciplinary codes and
judicial systems of the various armed forces.7  Nothing established by an ICC
treaty should be allowed to undermine these most fundamental protections
against abuses of basic human rights.
More importantly, the ICC was conceived to bring to justice individual per-
petrators of the most heinous acts.  It was not designed to be—and should not
become—a means of addressing international security issues associated with
state action since this undermines the structures in place to maintain interna-
tional peace and security.  In this regard, the court should not supplant highly
developed national legal systems of states that have the right and duty to inves-
tigate and prosecute crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC without the
7. The United States has consistently demonstrated a willingness to discipline its own.  See, e.g.,
GEORGE S. PRUGH, LAW AT WAR: VIETNAM, 1964-1973, at 76-78 & annex K at 154 (1975)(discussing
war crimes prosecutions during the Vietnam conflict).  For more recent prosecutions, see, e.g., United
States v. McMonagle, 38 M.J. 53 (A.C.M.R. 1993) and United States v. Finsel, 33 M.J. 739 (A.C.M.R.
1991)(both cases involving prosecutions for, inter alia, shooting firearms into the air above Panama
City), and United States v. Mowris, No. 68 (Fort Carson & 4th Inf. Div (Mech) July 1, 1993), discussed
in Mark S. Martins, Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering, 143
MIL. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1994)(negligent homicide conviction of U.S. Army Specialist for killing a Somali
national).
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authority of the U.N. Security Council to do so.  It was always assumed that the
ICC treaty would ensure that the ICC would not become a vehicle for interfer-
ing with responsibilities of states, especially those with the demonstrated ability
to investigate and discipline their citizens and service members who are alleged
to have violated the law of armed conflict.
A number of jurisdictional formulations were proffered both before and
during the Rome negotiations.  None met the United States’ requirements of
adequate protection for U.S. forces, appropriate recognition of state sover-
eignty, and sufficient acknowledgment of the Security Council’s role.  Particu-
larly troublesome were initiatives to empower the court with true universal ju-
risdiction.  Such jurisdiction, surely asserted in the practice of most
governments of the world, is overly expansive when associated with an inde-
pendent, and relatively unaccountable, institution.  Under such an arrangement,
the court would have jurisdiction over individuals regardless of whether any
relevant state had consented to that jurisdiction.8
In considering definitions and elements of crimes, it was deemed critical that
the court be limited to dealing with only those offenses that were universally
recognized as crimes under international law.9  The ICC is an inappropriate ve-
hicle for legislating substantive international criminal norms or for advancing
definitions of crimes that are themselves politically controversial (for example,
the use of nuclear weapons or the crime of aggression).  The United States de-
termined that the list of crimes should be limited to genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity, and that elements of proof for each offense should be
specifically enumerated in the treaty text.
The U.S. proposal for elements of proof is a useful case in point regarding
the utility of various checks and balances.  The exposition of elements of proof
is a necessary component of a lawful criminal justice system.  While under-
standing that different criminal justice systems function with different levels of
specificity and precision, in order for the ICC treaty to enjoy widespread accep-
tance and function appropriately, the court must have standards of due process
that are at least as rigorous as those of its member states.  Considering the seri-
ousness of the crimes and penalties within the jurisdiction of the court, specific-
ity as to criminal elements becomes an issue of fundamental fairness and the
protection of human rights.  The articulation of elements gives meaning to the
principle of legality, nullum crimen sine lege, and those elements serve as a nec-
essary guide to prosecutors as to what must be proved and to defense counsel as
8. Though the most extreme versions of this proposal were ultimately rejected, in some circum-
stances the statute authorizes jurisdiction over individuals without the consent of any state that might
take responsibility for the prosecution.  That is, if jurisdiction is based on territoriality, the state of terri-
tory is responsible, and may be held accountable, for the conduct and fairness of the prosecution.
When jurisdictional authority is delegated via the ICC regime, responsibility can be shirked and the ac-
countability of the Westphalian system is lost.
9. Customary status was generally the touchstone for determining which offenses would be in-
cluded in the statute.  See, e.g., 1 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an Inter-
national Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, at 16, U.N. Doc. A/51/22
(1996)(confirming understanding that the statute is not intended to create new substantive law).
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to what must be defended against.  Equally important to the United States are
concerns that ICC judges—in the absence of elements—might apply their var-
ied and not always pertinent experiences to shape the law in unforeseen ways.
Such judicial activism is improper for any body not directly accountable to the
people,10 and it is especially inappropriate for a criminal court.  An institution
that purports to enforce the law must itself be bound by it.11
Regarding information deemed vital to a state’s national security interests,
the draft statute naturally encouraged state cooperation with court requests for
documents and evidence.  What was not clear at the beginning of the Rome ne-
gotiation was where the final decision lay as to what documents, witnesses, or
other evidence must be provided to the court, even over a state’s objection
based on national security objections.  The United States strongly believed that
a state’s legitimate right to assert national security reasons for refusing to sur-
render sensitive material should not be subject to a contravening ICC order.
While a state would normally not spurn cooperation with an appropriately con-
stituted ICC, at the same time, the ICC should not be empowered to overrule
state decisions regarding national security matters.  ICC judges would not be
selected based on their expertise in the national security matters of states they
may never have even visited.  The United States thus considered a strong na-
tional security exception to be an essential component of the statute’s state co-
operation regime.
Finally, the United States was concerned with the proper balance to be
struck regarding certain substantive principles of criminal law.  For example, it
would be inappropriate for obedience to lawful orders to serve as a defense for
war crimes, but a soldier should not be held liable for obeying an apparently
lawful order.12  Similarly, as rules of evidence and procedure represent the es-
sential working mechanisms of any criminal justice system, the United States
determined that clearly articulated rules of evidence and procedure, specifically
set forth in the statute, were essential to a court worthy of support.  Such rules
help safeguard fundamental principles of fairness and ensure that the funda-
mental rights of potential defendants are not left to the whims of international
judges from a variety of legal traditions.
10. Though beyond the purview of this article, it is worth noting that courts in democratic societies
are always at least indirectly accountable to the body politic over whose members it wields authority.
Such is not the case regarding ICC jurisdiction over nonparty nationals.
11. The requirement for elements of crimes was incorporated in Articles 9 and 21 of the statute.
For a more detailed discussion of the U.S. proposal for elements of crimes, including a copy of the text
currently being negotiated by the Preparatory Commission, see William K. Lietzau, Checks and Bal-
ances and Elements of Proof: Structural Pillars for an International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 477 (1999).
12. The ICC’s antecedents, the Nuremberg Charter and the statutes establishing the International
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, all contained simplistic statements that
obedience to orders was not a defense.  Such an unsophisticated summarization of customary law was
seen as inappropriate for a permanent court, and, at U.S. insistence, this provision was refined during
ICC negotiations.  See Charles Garraway, Superior Orders and the International Criminal Court: Justice
Delivered or Justice Denied, 81 INT’L. REV. 785 (1999).
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III
RESULTS OF THE ROME NEGOTIATIONS
The treaty text that resulted from the Rome negotiations met many of the
United States’ concerns.  There is a generally acceptable list of crimes within
the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction (aggression stands out as a notable ex-
ception).13  The definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity found in
the statute generally comport with customary principles of international law.
The Rome Conference accepted the proposal that there should be elements of
proof and rules of evidence and procedure set in place by the assembly of states
parties and not set ex post facto by the judges.14  A Preparatory Commission
(“PrepCom”) that will meet periodically through 1999 and 2000 is determining
the substance of these elements and rules.15  Though a majority of states favored
ICC authority over state national security decisions, an appropriate rubric was
obtained regarding sovereign protection of national security information sought
by the court.16  Finally, a number of provisions regarding general principles of
criminal law were acceptably negotiated, including an appropriate definition of
command responsibility17 and adequate criminal defenses such as a limited su-
perior orders defense18 and defense of “mission essential property.”19
While many U.S. concerns were accommodated after hard-fought battles in
Rome,20 the most significant ones were not.  As Ambassador David Scheffer,
United States Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues and head of the
U.S. delegation in Rome, said before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
13. ICC Statute art. 5.  Though the crime of aggression is listed in Article 5, the ICC’s jurisdiction
over that offense is predicated on the requirement that it is first defined in the statute through the
amendment procedure, which could be initiated only at the first review conference seven years after
entry into force.
14. See id. arts. 9, 21 & 22.
15. The PrepCom was established in an annex to the final act of the U.N. Diplomatic Conference
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in Rome, Italy, June 15-
July 17, 1998.  Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Resolution F of the Final Act require the PrepCom to draft Rules
of Procedure and Evidence and Elements of Crimes before June 30, 2000.  Annex I, Resolutions
adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10, Annex I, Resolution F, 5-6 (July 17, 1998)
[hereinafter Resolution F].  The General Assembly requested the Secretary General to convene the
PrepCom in G.A. Res. 53/105 (Dec. 8, 1998) and scheduled three meetings at the U.N. in New York.
The first PrepCom meeting was held from February 16-26, 1999.  Four additional three-week sessions
resulted in completed Elements of Crimes and Rules of Evidence and Procedure documents on June
30, 2000.  A sixth session took place in November and December of 2000 to work on financial regula-
tions, a relationship agreement between the United Nations and the Court, and an agreement on privi-
leges and immunities of the Court.  Less frequent future sessions can be expected until entry-into-force.
16. ICC Statute art. 72.
17. Id. art. 28.
18. Id. art. 33.
19. Id. art. 31(1)(c).
20. Beside those mentioned above, Article 98 was negotiated to provide the possibility that bilat-
eral agreements such as Status of Forces Agreements (“SOFAs”) could be negotiated to preclude sur-
render of U.S. personnel to the ICC by a host state.  “The Court may not proceed with a request for
surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under in-
ternational agreements . . . .”  Id. art. 98(2).
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following conclusion of the Rome negotiations, “I regret to report that certain
[U.S.] objectives were not achieved and therefore we could not support the
draft that emerged.”21  While addressing the Sixth Committee of the United Na-
tions several months later, Ambassador Scheffer was even more critical of the
treaty that resulted from the Rome negotiations.  Focusing on the jurisdiction
provisions specifically, he said,
The Rome Treaty will become the single most effective brake on international and re-
gional peacekeeping in the 21st century.  [The] fundamental flaws in the Rome Treaty
mean that the United States will not sign the present text of the treaty, nor is there any
prospect of signing the existing text in the future.22
Where the treaty fails, it fails significantly.  The ICC’s jurisdictional regime
not only is unsuccessful in providing adequate protection for U.S. troops and
leadership if the United States were to become party to the treaty,23 but it also
claims jurisdiction over non-party nationals.24  In addition, the final text of the
treaty includes the crime of aggression as a prospective crime within the court’s
jurisdiction once it is defined—a result that both surprised and disappointed the
U.S. delegation given the apparent intention of some states to define the crime
without requiring a consistent Security Council determination.25 Finally, the
United States has taken exception to several other statutory weaknesses such as
the establishment of an “independent” prosecutor,26 the “no reservations”
clause,27 and an occupied territory offense that begs for politically motivated
prosecutions.28
IV
JURISDICTION
Two aspects of the jurisdictional regime that emerged from the Rome con-
ference call for two concomitant consequences.  Because the jurisdictional re-
gime does not adequately protect U.S. troops and commanders from politically
motivated prosecutions, the United States cannot sign the treaty.  More impor-
tantly, however, Ambassador Scheffer cautioned his counterparts in Rome that
if they insisted on giving the court jurisdiction over non-party nationals outside
the authority of the United Nations Security Council, the United States would
21. Hearing before the Subcomm. on Int’l Operations of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th
Cong., 2d Sess. (July 23, 1998)(testimony of Ambassador David Scheffer) [hereinafter SFRC Hearing].
22. Sixth Committee Statement, supra note 6.
23. See ICC Statute art 12(1).
24. See id. art. 12(2), (3).  Since jurisdiction is a function of either territory or nationality, nonparty
nationals accused of committing offenses extraterritorially can be subjected to the court’s jurisdiction
by virtue of the consent of the state on whose territory the offense is alleged to have occurred.
25. See id. art. 5 (1)(d).
26. See id. art. 15.
27. Id. art. 120.
28. This offense was also drafted with a gloss on the Fourth Geneva Convention’s traditional
wording so that the offense proscribes transfers “directly or indirectly” of the occupying power’s popu-
lation.  Compare Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, arts. 146-48, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, with ICC Statute art. 8 (2)(b)(viii).
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be forced to oppose the court and its jurisdictional regime.  Though the United
States is currently engaged in efforts to reach agreement with the international
community to allow a cooperative, supportive relationship between the ICC
and the United States, the United States continues to be faced with the likeli-
hood of having to oppose the ICC Treaty because of its assertion of jurisdiction
over non-party nationals.
Regarding jurisdiction over individuals whose state of nationality is party to
the treaty, the Rome negotiators settled on a regime that fell short of U.S. ob-
jectives to maintain certain jurisdictional control over its own forces.  The stat-
ute grants the court “automatic” jurisdiction over the three categories of of-
fenses for all states parties.29 Referrals initiating such jurisdiction can derive
from any of three sources: the U.N. Security Council, a state party to the Stat-
ute, or the prosecutor acting in his or her independent capacity.30
The U.S. military has been much criticized for its stance on this critical as-
pect of the ICC Statute, but what the critics sometimes fail to recognize are the
unique and vital national security responsibilities of the U.S. armed forces and
the consequences of their front-line role in carrying out the nation’s national se-
curity strategy.  Though some bristle at a description of the United States as
“the indispensable nation,”31 it must be conceded that no other state regularly
has nearly 200,000 troops outside its borders, either forward deployed or en-
gaged in one of several operations designed to preserve international peace and
security.  To inhibit these forces as they seek to fill their crucial role is to take a
step backwards in international peacemaking.  “No peace without justice” was
the mantra-like aphorism touted in Rome, but we must remember that likewise,
there can be no justice without peace.  When he addressed the Rome Diplo-
matic Conference, quoting then-U.S. Representative to the United Nations,
Ambassador Bill Richardson said,
Many countries shoulder the burden of international security.  The United States par-
ticipates with other governments in military alliances and in the United Nations or
other multi-national peacekeeping operations.  Soldiers deployed far from home need
to do their jobs without exposure to politicized proceedings.  More generally, we are
not here to create a court that exists to sit in judgment on national systems, to second-
guess each action and intervene if it disagrees.32
Unfortunately, inhibiting U.S. forces is exactly what some ICC proponents
desire.  When frustrated by an inability to influence U.S. foreign policy directly,
29. ICC Statute art. 12(1).
30. Id. art. 13.  The concept of a proprio motu prosecutor was another distinct and significant con-
cern of the United States that was not accommodated in the statute.  The United States believed that
the ICC prosecutor should not have authority to initiate investigations and prosecutions in the absence
of a referral by either the Security Council or a state party.
31. The term, coined by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, should here be understood in its
narrow sense to refer to the United States as an indispensable participant in any major global problem-
solving effort, not in the pejorative sense that would juxtapose other nations as dispensable.  See Sam-
uel P. Huntington, The Lonely Superpower, 78 FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 1999.
32. Remarks by William Richardson, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, in Rome, Italy, at
the Opening Plenary Session of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court (June 16, 1998)(on file with author).
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some may be inclined to impact it indirectly by targeting those who make and
implement that policy.  The military missions of our current era are markedly
unlike the “traditional” cold-war scenarios of the past.  Today, the U.S. military
finds itself involved in a complex mixture of peacekeeping activities, humani-
tarian and disaster assistance missions, and counter-terrorism and counter-
proliferation missions, each unique and often carrying significant political “bag-
gage” in an increasingly fractious world.  Witness the situations in Kosovo and
Iraq and the conflicts raging in Africa.  In these circumstances, the military is
often the instrument of first resort for policymakers.  An ill-constituted ICC
with the authority to make the final determination as to which cases will be in-
vestigated or come before it invites use of the court for political mischief.
Those who would deny the possibility—even likelihood—of such ill-intended
referrals overlook the natural trajectory of emotions stirred by the use of armed
force.  When the jus ad bellum basis for a particular military action is ques-
tioned, powerless victims of that application of force may seek redress by fo-
cusing on any jus in bello implementation issues raised by the actions of com-
manders and armed forces personnel.33
Late in the Rome negotiations, in an effort to bridge the gap between the
United States and many of its friends and allies, the United States suggested a
treaty regime in which states parties would accept the automatic jurisdiction of
the court over the crime of genocide only, as had been recommended by the In-
ternational Law Commission in 1994.  As to the other core crimes, the United
States attempted to facilitate participation in the treaty by proposing a ten-year
transition period following entry into force of the treaty during which any state
party could “opt-out” of the court’s jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes
against humanity.  At the end of the ten-year opt-out period, several arrange-
ments were proffered, including mechanisms whereby states could accept the
automatic jurisdiction of the court over all of the core crimes, cease to be a
party to the court (withdraw from the treaty), or extend the opt-out period.
Even these modest suggestions were rejected (though a last-minute deal de-
signed to break apart the five permanent members of the Security Council ac-
33. Recent events in Kosovo provide the quintessential example of this potential abuse.  In 1999,
there was increasing political pressure for International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”) Prosecutor, Louise Arbour, to investigate “war crimes” committed by NATO forces and
subject to ICTY jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Jonathan M. Miller, International Law May Halt the Bombing,
LA TIMES, May 11, 1999, at B-7 (arguing that bombing as a form of pressure is illegal and that Presi-
dent Clinton’s plan to use bombing to increase pressure could yield a stronger ICTY case for war
crimes like “wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military ne-
cessity”).   A year later, Ms. Arbour’s successor, Ms. Carla Del Ponte, succumbed to this political pres-
sure and conducted an extensive inquiry into whether certain war crimes allegations and NATO’s re-
sponses to those allegations should be “formally” investigated and/or prosecuted.  Already, the
preparation of NATO’s response to the allegations has taken many months and hundreds of man-hours
to prepare.  See Charles Trueheart, War Crimes Court is Looking at NATO, WASH. POST, Dec. 29,
1999, at A20; Steven Erlanger, U.N. Tribunal Plays Down its Scrutiny of NATO Acts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
29, 1999, at A5.
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commodated French concerns by including a seven-year opt-out provision for
war crimes).34
The ICC Statute creates automatic jurisdiction for states parties, even po-
tentially withstanding a well-founded national decision not to prosecute.35
Though the United States would question the prudence of such a rubric, few
would doubt a state’s authority to consent to such an arrangement on behalf of
its own citizens.  Conversely, the statute’s assertion of jurisdiction over non-
party nationals is significantly more inimical to fundamental principles of inter-
national law.  In cases not referred by the Security Council, the treaty specifies
that a precondition to the jurisdiction of the court is consent by either the state
of territory where the crime was committed or the state of nationality of the al-
leged perpetrator (consent may be ad hoc or by virtue of joining the treaty).
The United States sought an amendment to the text that would have required
both of these countries to be parties to the treaty or, at minimum, that the con-
sent of the state of nationality of the alleged perpetrator be obtained before the
court could exercise jurisdiction.  As a last resort, the United States recom-
mended a provision that would discourage political manipulation of the court
by excluding jurisdiction over non-party nationals when the conduct arose in
the course of official acts of state.  The United States was not successful, and the
outcome threatens to undermine the credibility of the court.  Again, quoting
Ambassador Scheffer on this issue:
Our position is clear.  Official actions of a non-state party state should not be subject
to the court’s jurisdiction if that country does not join the treaty, except by means of
Security Council action under the U.N. Charter.  Otherwise, the [treaty] ratification
procedure would be meaningless for governments.  Under such a theory, two govern-
ments could join together to create a criminal court and purport to extend its criminal
jurisdiction over everyone, everywhere in the world.36
The authors of the jurisdictional regime would claim it to be an attempt to
establish a “balance” between those who would desire a court with inappropri-
ately expansive jurisdiction on the one hand, and those who would apparently
weaken the court with too circumscribed a jurisdiction on the other.37  This
sense of balance is misplaced, as it fails to give adequate recognition to the role
of the Security Council or appropriate consideration to the court’s role in ex-
isting international frameworks.  The problem is that the drafters’ paradigm
34. See ICC Statute art. 124 (authorizing a state, on becoming a party, to declare that it does not
accept the court’s jurisdiction for war crimes alleged to have been committed by its nationals for seven
years).
35. If the ICC proves to act consistently with the apparent spirit of the Rome Treaty, the concept
of complementarity would admittedly make the instance of a prosecution that overrides a state deter-
mination rare.  Complementarity provisions allow ICC prosecution in contravention of a state’s deci-
sion not to prosecute only if the decision is found by the court to result from the “unwillingness or in-
ability of the State genuinely to prosecute.”  ICC Statute art. 17.1(b).
36. SFRC Hearing, supra note 21, at 13.
37. Keynote address by Mr. Philippe Kirsch for the Cornell International Law Journal symposium
on the ICC (Mar. 5, 1998), printed in substantive part in Philippe Kirsch, Keynote Address, The Interna-
tional Criminal Court: Consensus and Debate on the International Adjudication of Genocide, Crimes
Against Humanity, War Crimes, and Aggression, 32 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 437 (1999).
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does not recognize the value of a balance in its own right, but only the desir-
ability of attracting support from as many states as possible.  Thus, the drafters
entertained proposals that created an independent court with as much authority
as possible, while still attracting the support of as many states as possible.  The
able Chairman of the Committee of the Whole that drafted the Rome Statute,
Canadian Phillipe Kirsch, opined that one of the purposes motivating the draft-
ers of the ICC Statute was to break the U.N. Security Council’s monopoly on
international justice.38  Chairman Kirsch was correct.  But this is neither a prac-
tical goal nor an especially noble one.  The result is that there are significant
gaps in global support for the treaty.  “Breaking the monopoly” may translate
into creating an additional stumbling block to badly needed proactive U.N. Se-
curity Council responses to international crises.
Ironically, while on one hand the court’s jurisdiction is too independent and
robust, inserted limitations went in the wrong direction.  Most atrocities—and
certainly such is the case in recent years—are committed internally.  And most
internal conflicts are between warring parties of the same nationality.  Such in-
ternal crimes can easily escape the ICC’s jurisdictional trigger of nationality or
territory-based consent since the potentially relevant states are one and the
same.  Thus, the worst offenders of international humanitarian law can choose
never to join the treaty and be fully insulated from its reach absent a Security
Council referral.  Recent events call our attention to Pol Pot and the vicious
reign of the Khmer Rouge, the crimes of Saddam Hussein, and the Kosovo
atrocities perpetuated by the regime of Slobodan Milosevic.  To bring such
rogue leaders or their mercenary consorts to justice often requires some form of
intervention, perhaps based on Security Council authorization.  However, any
peacekeeper or peace enforcer sent to quash an ongoing humanitarian disaster,
and perhaps to bring its perpetrators to justice, would not enjoy the same ICC
immunity as the rogue state actors themselves.  For instance, absent a Security
Council referral, Milosevic would be immune from jurisdiction for any offense
committed against his people, but NATO aircrews attempting to stop his forces
from committing atrocities would not be.39
Thus, despite the attempt at a “balance,” it might be argued that the Rome
Treaty combines the worst of both worlds.  Reaching the most egregious viola-
tions of fundamental human rights—those occurring in internal armed con-
flicts—still requires Security Council involvement (a feature opposed by those
who favor a powerful, independent and autonomous court), but it does not re-
38. See id.
39. Article 12 of the ICC Statute is somewhat ambiguous in that it does not explicitly clarify
whether a nonparty state’s “consent” to jurisdiction based on territoriality would be attended by a con-
sequent acceptance of jurisdiction for its own nationals.  Some have begun discussing an interpretive fix
to this provision to mitigate the perversity associated with a despot’s ability to shield himself from ju-
risdiction while granting the ICC jurisdiction over foreign troops in his territory.  A plain reading of
Article 12 seems to allow one-sided acceptance of jurisdiction, but the language could be interpreted to
involve some form of reciprocal or symmetric arrangement.  However, it is unclear what temporal, geo-
graphical, and situational parameters would define that symmetric acceptance of jurisdiction.  See ICC
Statute art. 12.
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quire Security Council involvement to put even non-party peacekeepers at risk
(a feature opposed by the United States).  The treaty purports to establish an
arrangement whereby U.S. armed forces operating overseas could conceivably
be prosecuted by the ICC even if the United States has not agreed to be bound
by the treaty.  Not only is this contrary to fundamental principles of treaty law,40
it may inhibit the willingness of the United States to use its military to meet alli-
ance objectives and participate in multinational operations, including interven-
tions to save civilian lives.  The treaty fails to provide desirable jurisdictional
authority, while sacrificing important international law precepts in the process.
In this way, the Rome Treaty undermines the achievement of the very princi-
ples and goals that purport to serve as its raison d’être.
V
THE ROME PROCESS
The failings of the jurisdictional regime are inextricably linked to the unfor-
tunate process that created it.  Days before the conclusion of the Rome conven-
tion, there were few experienced diplomats who expected a treaty to be con-
cluded.41  One cannot help but recognize the skills of those who managed to
complete a text.  Chairman Philippe Kirsch and a small team of bureau mem-
bers drafted the treaty’s most significant provisions literally in the middle of the
night—hours before the conference was scheduled to end.  Unfinished sections
were taken from the drafting committee before its work was completed and
pasted together to create the  document.  The treaty was then presented as a
take-it-or-leave-it package and eventually adopted by vote after a final U.S. at-
tempt at modification.
40. A thorough discussion of the legality of the ICC’s jurisdictional regime under international law
is beyond the scope of this article.  The Vienna Convention on Treaties reaffirms the fundamental
proposition of international law that those not party to a treaty are not bound by it.  See Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679.  Of course,
the twist in this instance is that the Rome Treaty does not purport to bind nonparty states directly, but
it claims coercive enforcement power over nonparty states’ citizenry.  The question of legality becomes
more complex when we note that the bases for jurisdiction, apart from Security Council referral, derive
from the most widely accepted predicates for national jurisdiction: nationality and territory.  States
regularly establish jurisdiction over offenses that occur in their territory or are committed by their na-
tionals.  Likewise, several treaties, especially in the anti-terrorism field, establish “prosecute or extra-
dite” requirements that concomitantly permit prosecution by a state with no direct territorial or nation-
ality justification.  However, these precedents do not dispositively resolve the question of whether
states can “delegate” their jurisdictional authority to a third party, or, more importantly, whether an
international institution has authority to accept jurisdiction so delegated.  Closely related to this ques-
tion is that of to what extent the offenses in question represent jus cogens or crimes of universal juris-
diction.  If the argument ultimately relies on the prerequisite that the offense in question is a crime of
universal jurisdiction, a significant discussion is then appropriate regarding the status of the numerous
offenses in the ICC statute.  See generally Address by Ambassador David Scheffer, International
Criminal Court: The Challenge of Jurisdiction, Annual Meeting of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law (Mar. 26, 1999)(to be published in the proceedings of that annual meeting); Madeline Mor-
ris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-party States, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13
(Winter 2001).
41. Some delegates even left the conference early, expecting to return at a subsequent session.
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Besides the potentially untoward jurisdictional results discussed above re-
garding internal conflicts, this process resulted in several ironic, or perhaps even
perverse, anomalies.  For example, because of the extraordinary way deals were
cut in the last hours of the negotiations, Article 124 creates a seven-year war
crime “opt-out” for states parties.42  No such jurisdictional limitation is available
to non-party nationals.  Therefore, a state that becomes party to the treaty can
opt out of war crimes and actually limit the court’s jurisdiction over its own citi-
zens while the nationals of non-party states are subject to the entirety of the
court’s subject matter jurisdiction.43  Non-party nationals are actually more vul-
nerable to the court’s jurisdiction than nationals of states parties.  Some have
described this as an inducement to join the treaty.  At best it is a thoughtless er-
ror; at worst it is an unabashed attempt to further isolate the United States in
the final hours of the negotiation by drawing away one or more permanent
members of the Security Council, which had otherwise held fairly consistent
views on jurisdictional issues.44  Regardless of the motivation, it demonstrates
the unprincipled nature of the jurisdictional regime.
Articles 11 and 121 are similarly perverse in their potential application.  The
temporal jurisdiction of the court, laid out in Article 11, limits jurisdiction to
crimes committed after entry into force for that state.45 As with Article 124, the
language of Article 11 is imprecisely drafted,46 but if the provision is interpreted
as applying to individuals, then a state could theoretically shield an accused na-
tional by joining the statute before trial, thus immunizing the individual for all
42. Operative language from Article 124 reads, “A State, on becoming a party to the Statute, may
declare that, for a period of seven years after the entry into force of this Statute for the State con-
cerned, it does not accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to
in article 8 when a crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its territory.”
43. An interesting interpretive issue arises as to whether the language of this provision applies to
all cases against nationals of the relevant state, or only to state responsibilities under the treaty; that is,
if the alleged offender’s state of nationality is different from the state of territory where the offense oc-
curred, and if the ICC’s jurisdiction is based on the party status of the state on whose territory the of-
fense occurs, and that state did not take advantage of the seven-year opt-out, then does a different state
of nationality’s opt-out shield the offender?  The intent of the drafters was indeed to shield all nation-
als, regardless of the basis for jurisdiction.  However, the language is not artfully drafted in this respect,
and several treaty signatories have expressed an intent to interpret the exclusion in a more restrictive
vein.
44. In fact, the United Kingdom joined the “like-minded” group (constituting the largest block of
voting states) prior to the Rome Conference, but the other permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council (the P-5) generally held positions similar to those of the United States on the most important
issues throughout the conference.  In the final days, the United Kingdom joined the other P-5 countries
in their jurisdictional proposal that was ultimately rejected.  At the end of the conference, France and
Russia joined the majority after being offered the opt-out inducement.
45. Applicable language from Article 11 reads, “If a State becomes a Party to this Statute after its
entry into force, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the
entry into force of this Statute for that State . . . .”  ICC Statute art. 11 (2).
46. The inartful wording of this provision, inserted long before any final jurisdictional regime was
determined, leaves open the possibility that the provision applies to either the state and its obligations
only, or to the nationals of that state as well.  An informal polling of delegates at the Rome conference
yielded both interpretations, though, as with Article 124, shielding individuals was clearly the intent of
its drafters.
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conduct prior to the entry into force for that state.  Non-party nationals do not
enjoy such jurisdictional limitations.
Finally, Article 121 presents the clearest example of a jurisdictional anomaly
since its language is unambiguously oriented toward individuals as opposed to
states.  Under paragraph five of that article, amendments to the list of crimes
within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court are not applicable against na-
tionals of states parties that fail to ratify the amendment.  Therefore, states that
join the treaty have the ability to shield their citizens from jurisdiction over all
crimes not currently in the statute.  There is no similar limitation, however, to
the list of crimes that is potentially available for application against non-party
nationals.  Therefore, in theory, U.S. citizens could be made subject to the ju-
risdiction of the court for any number of currently unknown future offenses,
even if the United States were not party to the treaty, but states parties could
effectively shield their nationals.
Besides highlighting the unprincipled nature of the jurisdictional regime,
this last example provides a good illustration of the unfortunate technical con-
sequences of this last-minute package approach to treaty-making.  With sub-
stantial portions of the treaty still unwritten on the last night of the five-week
conference, the drafting committee was obviously unable to complete its work
of rationalizing various constituent texts.  Dozens of technical/administrative er-
rors were discovered and corrected after the vote on the statute’s text and after
many had already signed the treaty.  These corrections had (and have) varying
degrees of substantive effect.47  In the case of Article 121, paragraph 5, both the
version of the treaty adopted by the Rome Conference and the version initially
distributed by the United Nations describes the amendment procedure for sub-
stantive offenses as applying to “Article 5” amendments.  At the time the deal
was made on Article 121’s amendment provisions, the working drafts of the per-
tinent portions of the statute had all crimes listed in Article 5.  Article 5 cur-
rently refers only to broad categories of crimes, which were further parsed in
Articles 6, 7, and 8.  The “deal” language, however, was never adjusted.  Thus, a
technical reading of Article 121, paragraph 5 would presumably allow individu-
als to be prosecuted under crimes appended to Articles 6, 7, or 8, without re-
gard to the status of ratification by the state of nationality.48  States parties could
preclude jurisdiction only over a new “category” of crimes.  The drafters of Ar-
ticle 121 clearly did not intend this result, and the most recent version of the
47. See Proposed Corrections to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
C.N.502.1998, Treaties-3 (Annex).
48. Relevant language reads, “In respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment,
the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when commit-
ted by that State Party’s nationals or on its territory.”  ICC Statute art. 121(5).  Unlike Articles 11 and
124, the language of this provision clearly precludes jurisdiction over any national of a non-ratifying
state, regardless of the basis for jurisdiction.
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treaty text issued by the United Nations Secretariat includes an amendment
that includes a reference to Articles 6, 7, and 8. 49
Broader process-based concerns also attend the manner in which the treaty
was adopted.  Innis Claude, in his seminal work on the United Nations, gave
significant weight to the various organizational dynamics subsumed within the
institution.50  Though the General Assembly operates on the simple democratic
system of one vote per state, the U.N. Security Council acknowledges and re-
flects a Realpolitik that fit the post-World War II global community.  While a
discussion of these U.N. bodies is clearly beyond the purview of this article, few
would contest the fact that neither the paradigm of the General Assembly nor
that of the Security Council are the natural creations of unassailable logic.51  The
balance reflected in these two institutions, however, coupled with the bureauc-
racy of the Secretariat, has served in some ways to structure the international
order for the last fifty years.  The ICC Statute and the process that created it
threaten to undermine that order.
We see an incipient and unfortunate trend—given momentum by the Ot-
tawa Landmine Convention—wherein states attempt to create “instant” cus-
tomary international law.  The putative authority for this customary status is
simply the large number of signatories, making more important the fact that the
Ottawa model does not establish the treaty text by consensus.  A consensus ap-
proach to treaty-making best preserves the principles of consent and reciprocity
among states, principles that have served as underpinnings of international law.
Consensus-based negotiations marry the desire of some for democratic equiva-
lence among states with the reality of inequalities of resources, population, and
political and military power.  Admittedly, there is a downside associated with
the consensus rubric in that negotiations can be stymied by lack of agreement.
A vote or the threat thereof can break a logjam, as it did in Ottawa and in
Rome, but the result is ultimately reduced credibility and an inability to reflect
legitimate and appropriate relative influence in de facto international law-
making.  The propriety of this method of international legislation is question-
able and not deserving of U.S. support.
49. Article 121, para. 5 of U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, released during the first year after July 17,
1998, still referred to “amendment[s] to article 5.”  The same provision in the current text reads,
“Amendment[s] to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute.”
50. See generally INIS L. CLAUDE, SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROCESS
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1961).
51. Most legislative bodies today operate with authority and procedural rules deriving from some
form of democratic principles.  However, there is no “pure” democracy that fits every situation.  The
U.S. Congress is divided so as to recognize the legitimate representational interests of both states and
individuals.  Corporate charters usually reflect levels of financial commitment.  In addition, the U.N.
and other international organizations have their own schemes for attributing voting power.  A discus-
sion of these is beyond the scope of this paper, other than to point out the obvious:  Different func-
tional situations warrant different schemes.  The authors of the U.N. Charter devised a scheme in which
the international application of force does not require concurrence of all states, or even a majority of
them.  It does, however, require unanimity among five major powers.  Conceding the fact that many in
the community of nations view this particular scheme with disfavor, and accepting arguendo that a
change is appropriate, it would seem obvious that the establishment of an international criminal court is
not the ideal mechanism for effecting such a change.
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This “fast-track” approach is arguably more nefarious in the ICC context
than it was in its Ottawa Convention sibling because the landmine ban never di-
rectly purported to establish direct legal authority over non-party states (though
during the ICC negotiations, many claimed the Ottawa Convention had already
established a customary norm due to the number of signatories alone).  In the
ICC context, however, the majority vote purports to establish coercive authority
over the citizenry of the world.  If a single treaty can in fact move us toward
near-instant customary law status—a proposition that is doubtful at best—it
should be a treaty adopted by consensus.
VI
THE ICC’S INSTITUTIONAL ROLE
One of the thorniest problems with the Rome Statute is not the substance of
its authority, but the extent of that authority vis-à-vis other international institu-
tions.  Crassly stated, proponents of the court wanted as much authority given
to judges as possible—even at the expense of, in fact, purposefully at the ex-
pense of, the traditional roles of states and other international institutions such
as the Security Council.
Much of the conflict during ICC negotiations derived from the broad meas-
ure of displeasure in which the Security Council is viewed by many states.  U.S.
positions on the ICC treaty were generally consistent with the view that the ICC
should be a court whose authority extends to individuals, but not states.  Any
court decision directed at the actions of sovereign state determinations would
have only suasive authority, and the ICC’s direct power would be carefully
checked by other international structures such as the Security Council.  By con-
trast, the court’s most vocal proponents held the view that the more authority
given to the ICC, the better.
The debate over the national security exception to state cooperation serves
as a good example of the conflict of perspectives regarding the ICC’s appropri-
ate role internationally.  For most of the five weeks in Rome, two fundamen-
tally different proposals were on the table.  Both allowed a state to refuse sur-
render of a document or other evidence for reasons of national security.
However, one proposal allowed the court to assess the bona fides of a national
security claim and ultimately to “order” the state to surrender material, without
regard to the claim.  The other (U.S.) proposal, authorized no such court “or-
der” against a state, but instead ultimately allowed a referral of the matter to
the assembly of states parties or the Security Council.  While a successful result
eventually was negotiated in the last hours of the conference,52 the debate
52. See ICC Statute art. 72.  The United Kingdom had the competing proposal, which was very
similar to the U.S. proposal except that it ultimately allowed the ICC to “order” surrender of classified
documents that a state wanted to retain for national security reasons.  The United Kingdom did not
fear this provision because the threshold their proposal established for a court to rightly “order” sur-
render was so high that it would effectively preclude surrender.  As a matter of principle, the U.S. pro-
posal would not have allowed the court authority to “order” surrender since a state’s national security
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clearly evinced a majority intent to have an international criminal court with
coercive authority over states themselves.  At one point, a delegation inter-
ceded with the statement that there appeared to be no room for compromise
since the simple issue was whether or not the ICC should have authority over
states themselves.  That delegation’s answer matched that of the majority of
delegations that intervened—the ICC judiciary should have ultimate authority
over any state.
The movement simply to create an international criminal court is itself a
monumental task.  The Rome Treaty, however, does more than simply create a
court.  It purports to transform fundamental international relations.  Those who
defend the legality of the ICC’s jurisdictional regime claim that it does not vio-
late international law because it is merely a delegation of uncontroverted sover-
eign state authority (that is, jurisdictional authority based on nationality and/or
territory).  Accepting, arguendo, the legality of that delegation, it does not nec-
essarily follow that the ICC can accept that delegation.53  International law sur-
rounding jurisdiction is grounded in the framework of a Westphalian system of
state responsibility.  Traditionally, responsibility for the exercise of jurisdiction
has rested on the states.  Through the ICC’s regime, a state may delegate juris-
dictional “authority.”  That authority exists, however, within a paradigm in
which the same state must accept responsibility for the exercise of jurisdiction,
and may ultimately be held accountable for it.  Responsibility and accountabil-
ity cannot be delegated.
Similarly, by claiming enforcement powers over non-party individuals, the
ICC arguably redistributes enforcement authority currently reserved for the
United Nations Security Council.  This should have been ultra vires for the
Rome conference.  Since 1945, the Security Council has not fulfilled the most
optimistic goals for the United Nations, and many see enforcement of interna-
tional law as one of its failings.  However, the existence of a shortcoming does
not necessarily yield the conclusion that the ICC is the institution that should
provide the remedy.  Some see an inherent “unfairness” associated with the
relative influence of the five permanent members of the Security Council.
However, perceived unfairness does not necessarily militate in favor of shifting
power to an independent international criminal court.  “Fairness” has never
been the talisman of international peace and security; the Security Council’s
structure is based on pragmatic concerns that simply cannot be ignored.  An in-
ternational criminal court should not be so independent as to encourage ma-
nipulation with the aim of influencing another state’s foreign policy or national
security interests.  Coercive authority over the extraterritorial policies and ac-
tivities of a state is the clear realm of the Security Council.
interests are inherently beyond the competence of the ICC’s criminal judges.  The U.S. position, in sub-
stance, ultimately prevailed, but only after its effects were camouflaged in the treaty’s complex lan-
guage.
53. See generally Morris, supra note 40.
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One aspect of the ICC treaty animates a great deal of the colloquy on how
the United States should respond to it, and that is the complementarity regime.
The preamble to the Rome Statute states that “the International Criminal
Court established under this statute shall be complementary to national crimi-
nal jurisdictions.”54  Articles 17-19 give life to this principle and, indeed, provide
a helpful standard recommending judicial restraint.  Under the formula of Arti-
cle 17, cases are inadmissible when they are being or have been investigated or
prosecuted by a relevant state.  However, the statute also gives the ICC author-
ity to admit the case if the investigation, prosecution, or related decision is
deemed to result from an “unwillingness or inability of the [s]tate genuinely to
prosecute.”55  All of the checks and balances related to complementarity are still
fatally inadequate because they are entirely self-judged and applied by the ICC.
Many argue that the United States can always be expected to investigate
and prosecute its own and need not fear an ICC.  This argument is usually ac-
companied by acclaim for the U.S. military’s well-conceived law of war pro-
gram56 and military justice system.57  Indeed, it is virtually certain that every le-
gitimate claim involving egregious violations of the law of war will result in
some form of internal investigation and/or prosecution.  However, it is not ac-
tual violations, legitimately investigated and prosecuted, with which the United
States is concerned.  The concern is use of the court as a tool for influencing
U.S. foreign policy by holding at risk those who implement that policy.  For ex-
ample, Libya recently opened legal proceedings against various members of the
Reagan Administration, including military officers, for the 1986 air raids on
Tripoli and Benghazi, charging them with premeditated murder.58  Certainly, the
United States does not view these factual circumstances as warranting a crimi-
nal investigation for war crimes, but the potential impact on foreign policy if
such allegations were given currency is manifest.
Promoters of the current statute blithely credit the future judiciary with
apolitical self-restraint that will pose no threat to U.S. foreign policy or those
who implement it.  Additional protections like that of the pretrial chamber are
said to take the risk of wayward proceedings to infinitesimal levels.  While there
is every reason to believe the ICC will attract only the most qualified servants of
the rule of law, Americans, for good reason, are not culturally disposed toward
such “trust” of an institution.  Founders of the United States established a care-
fully structured separation of powers that is not as evident in other democratic
governments.  Though coined by a British Lord, the maxim that power tends to
54. ICC Preamble (10).
55. Id. art. 17(1)(a)(b).
56. See generally DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 5100.77, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM
(Dec. 9, 1998)(detailing implementation of law of war program throughout Defense Department).
57. See generally MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (1984)(executive order
regulating implementation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice).
58. See Libya charges Reagan officials with “premeditated murder,” WASH.TIMES, Apr.14, 1998, at
13; see also supra note 33 (discussing Kosovo example).
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corrupt59 perhaps enjoys greater recognition among Americans.  Despite the
ICC treaty’s incorporation of several internal checks and balances (largely at
U.S. insistence), the prosecutor does not answer to any executive authority and
the court is not subject to balances provided by a separate legislature.  In the
case of non-parties, the Court’s rulings regard individuals to whom it is not in
any way accountable.
It is recognized that a consequence of the ICC Statute is to dilute the veto
power of the five permanent members of the Security Council.  Though some
praise this circumstance as freeing the court of political fetters, it also frees the
court from a carefully devised political accountability.  Courts tend to arrogate
power to themselves, and the argument that an international institution will not
do anything unreasonable because of self-restraint is simply untenable.  Com-
plementarity is the right principle, but the ICC’s structure is not one that ade-
quately safeguards it.  As the longest standing constitutional republic in the
world, the United States should think twice about abandoning the principles
that have given it that credential.
VII
THE WAY AHEAD
After deciding not to join the Ottawa landmine ban in September 1997, the
Administration issued statements with carefully worded remarks pointing to
U.S.-specific circumstances as the reason it could not join the treaty.  While the
United States’ conciliatory posture after the Ottawa negotiations concluded in
Oslo was “diplomatic,” it had the unfortunate side effect of perpetuating the
myth that the problem resided with the U.S. armed forces that refused to sup-
port the treaty.  The United States thereby conceded the moral high ground to
treaty proponents when it is the Ottawa Convention itself and the attendant ne-
gotiating process that is deficient.  Conversely, with respect to the ICC, the
United States has been clear that the deficiency lies with the Rome Treaty and
the path taken to create it.  The United States’ support for the ICC should be
dependent on whether post-Rome negotiations yield acceptable accommoda-
tions of U.S. concerns.  At the July 1998 Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Hearing on the ICC, Ambassador Scheffer concluded that “the Administration
hopes that in the years ahead, other governments will recognize the benefits of
potential American participation in the Rome Treaty and correct the flawed
provisions in the treaty.”60
What will it take for the United States to “embrace” the ICC?  Adjustments
must be made to the treaty’s jurisdictional effects.  In order to obtain a peaceful
coexistence with the court, arrangements conferring jurisdiction over non-party
nationals should be amended to require either Security Council or state of na-
59. Letter from Lord Acton to Lord Creighton (Apr. 5, 1887).
60. SFRC Hearing, supra note 21, at 15.
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tionality consent for any offenses involving officially acknowledged state acts.61
Alternatively, a more robust concept of complementarity could accomplish the
same end.  In order for the United States to consider signing the treaty, the ju-
risdictional regime should be recast to protect U.S. officials and armed forces
members from politically motivated investigation and prosecution.
The specifics of adequate solutions are beyond the purview of this article,
but various conceptual avenues seem plausible.  A complementarity-based solu-
tion, in which the ICC is not independently vested with authority to overturn a
state’s complementarity determinations, would preserve appropriate tenets of
interstate comity.  A strengthened opt-out regime would accommodate those
who want to obtain the broadest participation while allowing the court to
“prove” itself over time.  An “official acts” exclusion could properly focus the
court’s attention on individual offenses while raising the political stakes for
those leaders who could then shield their crimes only by admitting them to be
officially sanctioned.62
Prospects for an accommodation of U.S. jurisdictional concerns are mixed,
and for some states, form is as important as substance.  Accommodations along
any one of the lines mentioned above would have to take account of the deli-
cate sensitivities associated with doing something that appears to alter the stat-
ute itself.  In November of 1998, the Sixth Committee of the United Nations
submitted a resolution relating to the ICC, which the General Assembly
adopted by consensus in December.  While the principal aim of the resolution is
to establish the Preparatory Commission to foster continued work and support
for the ICC treaty text adopted in Rome, in a concession to U.S. urgings, the
resolution also calls on the Preparatory Commission to “discuss ways to en-
hance the effectiveness and acceptance of the court.”63  Ambassador Scheffer
has been energetically exploring potential accommodations at each Preparatory
Commission session and in bilateral meetings during the intersessional periods.
The last chapter has yet to be written.
VIII
CONCLUSION
The United States remains committed to the furthering of international jus-
tice and accountability.  The United States’ support for the Yugoslavia and
Rwanda War Crimes tribunals more than proves this point.  What the United
States cannot support is an international court that fails to recognize its unique
responsibilities in the world when issues of international peace and security are
61. One could argue that this formula preserves the international law standard of consent as the
basis for all normative restrictions.  Consent would be either direct and specific, through an ad hoc de-
cision, general, through acceding to the treaty, or implied, through agreement with the U.N. Charter
scheme that serves as the basis for Security Council authority.
62. For a brief discussion of an “official acts” exclusion, see Theodor Meron, The Court We Want,
WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1998, at A15.
63. See G.A. Res. 53/105 (Dec. 8, 1998).
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involved.  As Ambassador Scheffer recently wrote, the United States is “called
upon to act, sometimes at great risk, far more than any other nation.  That fact
is sometimes hard for others to appreciate when [they], so hopeful for the infal-
libility of a future international court, lose sight of other realities in the interna-
tional system.”
It is important to remember that this is not merely a U.S. problem or an ex-
ample of American exceptionalism; it is the statute that needs to be strength-
ened.  The creation of any judicial system requires a delicate balance between
protecting individual rights and furthering the interests of justice, between
maximizing the ability to convict the criminal and protecting the human rights
of the innocent.  Likewise, the creation of any governmental authority involves
balancing the powers with which it is imbued and the restraints that keep it ac-
countable.  These balances become both more complex and more delicate as we
enter the world of customary international law, international relations, and in-
ternational institutions with no clear authority to which they are accountable.
All of the U.S. proposals related to an international criminal court have
been grounded in a thoughtful attempt to incorporate appropriate checks and
balances into the ICC Statute.  On the micro level, U.S. proposals, such as the
one for elements of crimes, reflect recognition of the necessary balance between
bringing an individual to justice and protecting that individual’s rights and the
integrity of the system.  From a macro perspective, U.S. jurisdictional proposals
reflect an attempt to balance necessary judicial authority on one side, and pres-
ervation of state sovereignty and current structures that promote international
peace and security on the other.
Unfortunately, many with the best intentions have hastily joined a move-
ment in which the delicacy of these balances has not been adequately acknowl-
edged.  International humanitarian law is simply seen as either “progressing” or
“regressing.” Safeguards built in by the United States are viewed as “conces-
sions” that “raise the bar” for the prosecutor, and the only “balance” sought is
one between the inherent strength of the court, and widespread support for it.
A more deliberate and sophisticated review is required.  Recognition of the
need for appropriate checks and balances is really an acknowledgment that the
rule of law itself must be preeminent.  Both the “no peace without justice” man-
tra and its antithesis are incomplete.  There can be neither peace nor justice
unless the rule of law itself has been firmly established, and the voice of a sim-
ple majority of states cannot rightly claim to have established that rule of law.
The United States’ participation is not only needed for practical reasons, but
also to bolster the court’s moral authority, and eventually its universal accep-
tance.
The establishment of an international criminal court is a noble undertaking
described by some as fulfilling a vision of moving the world from a “culture of
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impunity” to a “culture of accountability.”64  It is, in fact, perhaps one of the
most important undertakings of the last several decades, making the unfortu-
nate circumstances that attended its genesis that much more disturbing.  Cob-
bling together text to establish such a court on the penultimate day of a diplo-
matic conference, in the face of direct and clear opposition by one of the free
world’s leading powers, is not an auspicious beginning for the “culture of ac-
countability.” As it was with Mark Twain, to report the ICC’s death would be
premature, but so is the fanfare regarding its birth.  More work needs to be
done to give the court the credibility, the longevity, and, ultimately, the author-
ity it deserves.  The changes sought by the United States should be imple-
mented not just because U.S. participation is key to an effective, functioning
court, but because enacting them promotes the rule of law and is therefore the
right thing to do.
64. The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole at the Rome Conference, Philippe Kirsch, has
so described the vision captured by the ICC Statute.  See Keynote Address by Mr. Phillipe Kirsch, su-
pra note 37.
